Perceptual wronging and perceptual injustice

September 20

The Vienna Moral Philosophy Group invites you to a talk by Dr. Tom McClelland (University of Cambridge) Wednesday, September 20, 13.15-2.45 in NIG, HS 2G.

You can wrong people through how you treat them. You can wrong people through how you think about them. But can you wrong people through how you perceive them? I argue that you can and that such perceptual wronging underwrites pervasive social injustices. This proposal relies on specific claims about perception and about wrongdoing. Regarding perception, I argue that perceptual content is rich and includes features such as salience, affordances and high-level kinds. Regarding wrongdoing, I argue that even though perceptual processes are relatively automatic, a subject can sometimes be responsible for how they perceive the world. I then reflect on what this might mean for our understanding of structural injustice.

Everyone is welcome!