Meetings in this semester will be held in person on Mondays, between 16:30 and 18:00. The meetings will be held in seminar room 3B (B0315), 3rd floor at the Department of Philosophy, NIG Building, Universitätsstrasse 7.
- Mo, 31.03.2025, 16:30-18:00, Sebastian Horvat (Universität Wien): "From physical possibility to physical compossibility"
Raum 3B (B0315), 3. Stock am Institut für Philosophie - Mo, 07.04.2025, 16:30-18:00, Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau (Universität Wien): "Finitism in the Vienna Circle and its Philosophical Consequences"
Raum 3B (B0315), 3. Stock am Institut für Philosophie - Mo, 05.05.2025, 16:30-18:00, Carolin Antos (Universität Konstanz): "(Anti)-Exceptionalism about Mathematics"
Raum 3B (B0315), 3. Stock am Institut für Philosophie - Mo, 12.05.2025, 16:30-18:00, Emils Zavelis (Universität Wien): "Metalogical pluralism"
Raum 3B (B0315), 3. Stock am Institut für Philosophie - Mo, 19.05.2025, 16:30-18:00, Constantin Brîncuş (Universitatea din București): "Categoricity by Inferential Conservativity"
Raum 3B (B0315), 3. Stock am Institut für Philosophie - Mo, 26.05.2025, 16:30-18:00, tba: "tba"
Raum 3B (B0315), 3. Stock am Institut für Philosophie - Mo, 02.06.2025, 16:30-18:00, Robert C. May (UC Davis): "tba"
Raum 3B (B0315), 3. Stock am Institut für Philosophie - Mo, 23.06.2025, 16:30-18:00, Michał Tomasz Godziszewski (University of Warsaw): "tba"
Raum 3B (B0315), 3. Stock am Institut für Philosophie
Please see our website for further information on the Logic Café colloquium, for past events, and regular updates: https://logik-cafe.univie.ac.at
The first talk in this semester will be by Michael Rieppel (Syracuse University): "In Search of Essentially Predicative Entities“ this Monday 10.03.2025.
Abstract: According to a Fregean view recently revived in higher-order metaphysics, predicates do not denote objects, construed as any kind of thing a name could denote, but must denote things of a fundamentally different logical type. A common route to that conclusion is via Russell's Paradox, but this doesn't do much to illuminate what it is about names and predicates that prevents them from both denoting kinds of objects. This paper critically examines more linguistically oriented arguments that attempt to establish the negative Fregean conclusion by reflection on the nature of predication, or how names and predicates combine to form truth-apt sentences in the first place. I begin with two such arguments but conclude that, properly situated in a general syntactic and semantic framework, they remain unconvincing. I then reconstruct a third argument, inspired by Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning, showing that something in a sentence must indeed have a semantic function other than that of denoting an object. However, the Fregean victory remains constrained, in that we have little reason to think English predicates must be what play that non-denoting role, especially if predicate position is to be open to quantification.